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Oil price shocks have become one of the main sources of macroeconomic fluctuations such as 
economic activity and inflation. This paper investigates the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks in the 
euro area by using a threshold VAR model estimated by Bayesian techniques. This approach captures 
the dependence of the transmission mechanism of oil price shocks on a) the sign of the shock and b) 
different states of the economy. The results suggest that oil price shocks have a stronger effect on 
output during periods of heightened uncertainty compared with periods of lowered uncertainty. This is 
partly due to the fact that, particularly during stressed periods, stock market reacts negatively following 
a positive oil price shock. In addition, positive and negative, large and small oil price shocks affect 
inflation differently. The findings suggest that policymakers should take into account the asymmetric 
nature of the oil price transmission mechanism when they are choosing how to respond to oil price 
shocks. 
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1. Introduction  
 Oil price shocks have become one of the main sources of macroeconomic fluctuations such as 
economic activity and inflation (Hamilton, 1996, 2003, 2008). However, linear models have not been 
able to deal with the potential asymmetric relationship between the effects of oil price fluctuations and 
business cycle phases (Hamilton 2011). Moreover, as Hamilton (1996, 2008) points out, while oil prices 
increases have preceded ten out of the past eleven recessions in the US, falling oil prices did not 
necessarily result in periods of high economic growth. This dependence of the transmission mechanism 
of oil price shocks on the sign of the shock and the states of economy, motivates our analysis. 
 This paper innovates and contributes in filling some existing gaps in the literature in the 
following directions. First, I study the effects of oil price shocks in the euro area economy during high 
uncertainty and low uncertainty periods. In contrast to previous studies, I use a threshold vector 
autoregression (TVAR) model to capture the asymmetric effects of the oil price transmission over 
different states of the economy. Second, standard VAR models estimated by the frequentist approach 
can only handle a small number of variables. This paper overcomes the curse of dimensionality by 
proposing a medium scale Bayesian TVAR framework. This approach, allow us to handle a larger 
information set by shrinking the parameters via the imposition of priors; thus, better reflecting the 
information dataset of central banks and the private sector. Therefore, the analysis provides a rich 
picture on the transmission of oil price shocks in various dimensions of the euro area economy. Third, 
within this context, I extend the analysis by evaluating potential correlations between the sign (and the 
size) of an oil price shock and economic cycles asymmetries. This potential asymmetry in the euro area 
is motivated by the fact that negative oil price shocks experienced since mid-2014 for example, may 
have had a greater role in pushing down inflation, than the positive shocks experienced during the crisis 
had in keeping it up. 
 In light of the above discussion, this paper seeks to deal with several questions emerge. 
Specifically, do oil price shocks impact the economy differently during high uncertainty periods, such as 
the financial and sovereign debt crisis, compared to more tranquil times? Further, do positive oil price 
shocks, impact inflation differently compared to the negative ones? Finally, do large shocks, like those 
experienced since mid-2014, have a different effect compared to smaller ones?  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature that 
motivates the asymmetry in the transmission of oil price shocks. Section 3 provides the empirical setup. 






2. Literature review 
 This section reviews the theoretical and empirical studies that motivate the asymmetric impact 
of oil price shocks on the economy. The effects of oil price innovations might be different in high and 
low uncertainty periods, much in the same way that monetary policy shocks have asymmetric effects in 
different states of the business cycle (Lo and Piger, 2005). In particular, the asymmetric transmission of 
oil price shocks in different states of the economy stem from the irreversibility of investment under the 
theoretical models developed by Bernanke (1983) and Pindyck (1991). The authors develop a model in 
which positive oil price shocks generate uncertainty in individuals and businesses. As a result, the 
former postpone their purchases of goods, while the latter are cautious about hiring and investing since 
it is expensive to reverse these decisions. As a result, firms postpone investment until the business 
climate becomes more certain. Therefore, for an oil importing economy, a highly uncertain environment 
amplifies the recessionary effects of an oil price increase. Recent empirical evidence for this type of 
asymmetry is provided by Van Robays (2016), who finds that the impact of oil shocks differs in times of 
high and low macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 Another type of asymmetry is based on the fact that the economy may respond differently to 
positive and negative oil price shocks. The theoretical studies of Davies (1987) and Davies and 
Haltiwanger (2001), for example, suggest that a change in oil price in oil importing countries causes 
sectoral shifts through the economy. Thus, an oil price rise leads to a reallocation of capital and labor 
away from the energy intensive sector. Since this takes time, unemployment rises, resulting in cutbacks 
in real output which amplifies the economic slowdown. In case of an oil price decline, the positive effect 
on economic activity is reduced by similar adjustment costs, dampening the economic expansion. More 
recently, Edelstein and Kilian (2007, 2009), suggest another theoretical model, according to which, this 
type of asymmetry arises because of precautionary savings. A positive oil price shock increases 
uncertainty regarding future economic conditions, thereby increasing precautionary savings. As a 
negative oil price shock for an oil importing economy is associated with lower uncertainty, positive and 
negative oil price shocks may have different effects on economic activity. The evidence from the 
empirical literature is mixed. Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sanchez (2005) and Herrera et al. (2011), find 
strong evidence of asymmetric effects on real GDP and inflation for G-7 countries, Norway and the euro 
area while, Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) and Herrera et al. (2015), suggest that there is no strong 





3. Data and Model set-up 
3.1 Model Set-up  
I examine the oil price transmission between different states of the economy by using a medium scale 
threshold VAR model of the following form: 
 
                    , var(            if     
  
                                   if     
       
   
where    is the matrix of n endogenous variables,          is the threshold variable, d is the time lag 
which is assumed to be known and set equal to two, and    is the threshold level.       and       
are lag polynomial matrices and      ,      represent the contemporaneous terms.  
 TVAR models have been recently used by the literature (Van Robays, 2016; Donayre and 
Wilmot, 2016) to examine the asymmetric impact of oil price shocks. The distinguishing feature of this 
approach is that it allows us to endogenously identify different regimes with respect to one endogenous 
transition variable. In this paper, I choose an index which measures the degree of uncertainty in equity 
markets and therefore, it separates the economy between high and low uncertainty periods. The two 
different states are determined by the value of this threshold variable with respect to a certain threshold 
which is estimated within the model.  
 The small size of the VARs typically used in these empirical applications potentially creates an 
omitted variable bias with adverse consequences for structural analysis (Giannone and Reichlin, 2006). 
In addition, the size limitation is problematic for applications which require the study of a larger set of 
variables than the core macroeconomic indicators.  
 This paper overcomes the curse of dimensionality by proposing a TVAR framework estimated 
by Bayesian techniques.  According to Banbura et al. (2010), by applying Bayesian shrinkage one is 
able to handle a larger set of information than a handful of variables.  The choice of this framework 
jointly addresses two issues. First, it provides a rich picture on the transmission of oil price shocks on a 
wide range of variables. Second, in contrast with most of the recent literature (Kilian, 2009; Peersman 
and Van Robays, 2009), I do not disentangle oil demand shocks from oil supply shocks as the focus of 
this study is to examine the effect of exogenous oil supply fluctuations (following other similar studies 
such as Fratzscher et al., 2014)  on the euro area. As I control for several macroeconomic and financial 
variables, it is more likely to filter out the endogenous part in the oil price shock of the proposed model, 




   
3.2 Data description 
 The following variables are included in the vector of endogenous variables: industrial 
production (IP), HICP, 3-month interbank rate, crude oil price, producer price index, economic 
sentiment, Euro stoxx 50, nominal effective exchange rate, yield spread and the eur/usd exchange rate. 
Last, I choose Vstoxx as my threshold variable. This index measures the degree of uncertainty in equity 
markets and therefore it allows me to identify high and low stressed or uncertainty periods (in line with 
similar studies that have used Vstoxx to identify different stress periods, for example, Bonciani and Van 
Roye, 2015)1. 
 Data are monthly from 2000:01 to 2016:12. All series are in log levels except for the variables 
that are already expressed in percentages for which no transformation is implemented. The oil price 
shock is identified through a standard Cholesky decomposition by assuming a conventional ordering of 
the variables (Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2004). In particular, IP is ordered first, followed by oil prices, 
inflation and interest rate. This ordering assumes that real output does not react contemporaneously on 
shocks to the rest of the variables; oil prices have an immediate impact on inflation rate, which is then 
allowed to feed into changes in interest rates; financial variables such as exchange rates and stock 
market indices are ordered last.  
 
3.3 Estimation 
Following Blake and Mumtaz (2012), I use a Gibbs algorithm to estimate the parameters 
       
 . The threshold value    is estimated by a Metropolis Hastings random walk algorithm within 
the Gibbs algorithm. I set a natural conjugate prior for the VAR parameters using dummy observations. 
For a detailed explanation of this prior implementation, see Banbura et al. (2007). 
 
Posterior distributions 
 The conditional posterior distribution of            in each regime       is given by: 
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where: 
                    
The conditional posterior distribution of    is given by the inverse Wishart distribution: 
                                                          
1 For robustness, I use the CISS index (composite indicator of systemic stress, see Holo et al. 2012 for details). I find that the main 
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   contain the data series       , augmented with the dummy observations that define 
the prior of the VAR system. 
 I estimate generalized impulse responses (Koop et al. 1996), to examine the impact of oil price 
shocks on the macroeconomy. Standard impulse responses are constant over time and they are 
symmetric not only in the sign, but also in the magnitude of the structural shocks. On the contrary, 
generalized impulse responses by construction allow us to examine the effects of the shocks of 
different magnitudes and directions. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Do oil price shocks matter more in periods of high financial uncertainty? 
 In this part, I aim to describe the impact of oil prices shocks to the whole economy. I focus my 
discussion on the variables that are shown to be mostly affected by a shock in oil prices. Accordingly, 
Figures 1 and 2 present the effect of oil price shocks on industrial production, HICP, interest rates, the 
stock market and economic sentiment, in high and low stress periods. 
 Figure 1 shows that, in a tranquil period, a 3 per cent increase in oil price leads to an 
immediate increase of 0.06 per cent in HICP, as it would be expected. Interest rates rise gradually to 
counteract the rise in inflation; after 10 months the increase is approximately 3 basis points. Despite 
remaining flat initially, output declines since the cost of production is higher. By the end of the 
forecasting horizon, output has fallen by 0.1 per cent. Finally, financial markets re-evaluate the earnings 
prospects of firms, and the stock market begins to decline. Similarly, economic sentiment also declines. 
 Figure 2 shows that, although the immediate increase in HICP is slightly lower compared with 
the tranquil period, the subsequent increase is stronger, reaching approximately 0.07 per cent after 10 
months. Interest rates also react more strongly immediately after the shock, increasing by 3 basis 
points, compared with the negligible initial increase in the tranquil period. Interestingly, economic 
sentiment and the stock market begin to decline much more quickly in the stressed period compared to 
the tranquil period.  
 The results imply that the sentiment is more fragile when there is increased financial 
uncertainty. This result is in line with other empirical studies regarding the impact of uncertainty on 
economic sentiment. For example, Denis and Kannan (2013) find persistently negative effects of 
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uncertainty on monthly economic sentiment indicators. In addition, the finding that stock market reacts 
negatively following a positive oil price shock, indicates that the model does capture oil supply shocks 
more closely, as demand shocks should be associated with a positive reaction of stock market (Kilian 
and Park, 2009; Bernanke, 2016). Overall, output declines much more quickly when the economy is 
stressed than when it is tranquil, mainly due to the deterioration of stock market returns and the 
investor sentiment. 
 Overall then, there is a significant difference between the impact of oil price shocks in uncertain 
and tranquil periods. However, the euro area economy has experienced a wide variety of oil price 
shocks over the period since the start of the financial and sovereign debt crisis. Throughout much of the 
crisis up to mid-2014 oil price shocks were positive. These shocks were relatively small, however, 
compared to the negative shocks that have been experienced since then. In both instances, 
movements in inflation have been attributed to these changes in oil prices. It is therefore interesting to 
consider the impact of different types of oil price shocks on HICP in the next section. 
 
4.2 Does the type of oil price shock matter? 
 In this section, I focus on the asymmetric nature of different types of oil price shocks on 
inflation2. Figures 3, 4 show the impact of shocks in high stressed periods. I first consider the impact of 
positive and negative oil price shocks on HICP as summarized in Figure 3 (note that the negative shock 
has been inverted for comparison). For the first periods following oil price shocks, there is a negligible 
difference in the size of the effect on HICP. However, after that period, the negative shock has a bigger 
impact on HICP such that, after 20 months the impact of the negative shock is 0.20% compared with 
the 0.15% in the case of positive shock. Overall, this suggests that the negative shocks experienced 
since mid-2014, may have had a greater role in driving down inflation, than the positive shocks 
experienced during the crisis had in keeping it up.  
 Next, Figure 4 shows the impact of large and small positive shocks. Here a large shock is twice 
as big as a small shock.  Initially, a large shock has almost twice the effect on HICP compared to a 
small shock; approximately 0.09% compared to 0.045% in the first month. However, over time, the 
large shock has a slightly bigger impact on HICP, such that after 10 months, it is 0.15% higher following 
a large shock compared with approximately 0.07% following a small shock. This finding implies that if 
                                                          
2
 In relation to output effects, consistent with the literature (see for example Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sanchez, 2015), I find evidence on 
the asymmetric response of output to oil price shocks. In particular, impulse response analysis shows that positive oil price shocks have a 
stronger effect on output compared with negative oil price shocks. In addition, the effect is much bigger in high uncertainty periods than 
low uncertainty periods. Results are available upon request. 
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policymakers worry about the impact of oil prices on HICP, they will have to respond more strongly to 
larger oil price shocks, whether positive or negative.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 This paper uses a Bayesian threshold VAR model to examine potential asymmetries on the 
transmission of oil price shocks. This approach captures the dependence of the transmission 
mechanism on the sign (and the size) of the shock and different states of the economy. The results 
suggest that there is a considerable difference between the impact of oil price shocks in uncertain and 
tranquil periods.  In particular, in response to positive oil price shocks, output declines much more 
quickly when the economy is stressed than when it is tranquil. Further examination of the results 
suggest that this asymmetry is due to the fact that stock market returns and economic sentiment 
decline much more quickly in the stressed period compared to the tranquil period. Considering the type 
of the shock and focusing on the effects of oil price shocks on inflation; the analysis shows that larger 
oil price shocks have a disproportionally bigger effect on HICP than smaller shocks. Similarly, negative 
oil price shocks have a bigger effect on HICP compared with positive shocks. Overall, the findings 
suggest that policymakers need to consider not just the economic situation, in which an oil price shock 
is occurring, but also the size and direction of the shock, when choosing a policy response. Extending 
the analysis by disentangling oil demand and oil supply shocks, may generate interesting results 
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Figure 1: Positive oil price shock in tranquil period 
 
 






Figure 3: Positive and negative oil price shocks on HICP in high stress periods. 
 
 
Figure 4: Large and small positive oil price shocks on HICP in high stress periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
